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Abstract 
 
Globalisation and technological advances have yielded to modern society the facility to 
migrate inter-continentally both rapidly and economically. Animal quarantine, by 
contrast, can be seen as an anachronistic remnant of a bygone age. While the technology 
to obviate the need for quarantine exists, some countries cling to tried and tested means 
of avoiding the spread of diseases. While this would not be a problem if there were no 
victims of these policies, the consideration that animals may be subject to unnecessary 
suffering through the process (and are possibly having their interests infringed) means 
that moral agents must re-examine the rules that place mute animals in this situation. Do 
we have moral obligations to our animal relatives in quarantine? The aims of this essay 
are to examine the issues surrounding this topic and to provide recommendations toward 
a more holistic, modern and compassionate solution. 
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 ‘Life is as dear to a mute creature as it is to man. Just as one wants happiness and fears 
pain, just as one wants to live and not die, so do other creatures.’1   
- His Holiness The Dalai Lama  
 
‘Mankind's true moral test, its fundamental test (which lies deeply buried from view), 
consists of its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: animals. And in this respect 
mankind has suffered a fundamental debacle, a debacle so fundamental that all others 
stem from it.’2 
- Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being  
                                                          
1 Quotes about animals, “Why Animals are Important to Us”. No Date. 
http://www.dogquotations.com/quotes-about-animals.html (accessed 3 July 2012). 
2 Ibid. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Companion animals often occupy a special place in the lives and consciousness of their 
human counterparts. We share a long history of symbiosis. It has been shown that 
keeping a pet - particularly a dog - can have beneficial impacts on human health and 
general well-being.3 The referenced article indicates that the benefits relate to lowered 
blood pressure and cholesterol as well as aiding in recovery from serious ailments like 
heart attack. The article concludes that these benefits may be credited to lowered stress 
levels. No wonder people may get attached to their pets and treat them like members of 
the family. 
 
A fact of life for many people (particularly South Africans) is emigration. In addition to 
relocating family members and the removal of possessions, people will need to consider 
taking their companion animals. What makes including pets4 unique is the issue of any 
quarantine. This could affect the emigrant’s decision of where to migrate, as well as 
whether or not to take her pets with her. An increasing number of countries – like 
Canada5 - have adopted a more up-to-date concept of and legislation around quarantine. 
This is, provided that the pet’s import papers are in proper order, she6 may accompany 
her owner on the same flight, to then be collected upon arrival at the destination. Other 
countries’ legislation is somewhat more draconian – necessitating more than six months 
                                                          
3 BBC News. “Dog-owners lead ‘healthier lives’”.  21 January 2007.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6279701.stm  (accessed 26 June 2012). 
4 Although the fashionable (indeed, even ‘politically correct’) name for pets in the literature is ‘companion 
animals’, I will be using the terms interchangeably in this paper. 
5 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, “Pet Imports”. 12 January 2012. 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/animals/terrestrial-animals/imports/policies/live-animals/pet-
imports/eng/1326600389775/1326600500578  (accessed 26 June 2012). 
6 I have generally used the feminine ‘she’ and ‘her’ to refer to an individual animal, but where applicable 
this also includes male animals. 
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in quarantine in the case of countries like Australia7 for pets from South Africa. This 
somewhat onerous time period may lead pet owners to either leave their pets behind, or 
euthanize them – even if they are young and healthy. (The issue of animal euthanasia, 
albeit important, is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present inquiry.)  
 
In my essay, I intend to cover quarantine only for dogs and cats – and to concentrate on 
the issue of rabies. The chief reason that some countries impose longer quarantine 
periods on animals is to avoid the introduction of diseases into local populations of 
animal life or humans from the imported animal. South African animals are seen by 
Australia as constituting a relatively high risk for rabies entering the country.8 Animals 
being transported from the UK to Australia are seen as representing fewer risks, and so 
the corresponding quarantine period is shorter. The fact that the UK quarantine rules 
have been relaxed to come in line with EU rules from January 2012 provides support to 
a position that procedures in other countries need review.9 New Zealand rules have also 
recently been relaxed after a review – meaning that a dog from South Africa in good 
health will ‘only’ need to spend a minimum of 10 days in quarantine – down from a 
similar regime to Australia’s current rules.10 This new process needs a veterinarian 
clearance - and if any causes of concern are found upon examination this period may be 
increased – on a case-by-case basis. If New Zealand is able to review and relax its 
requirements, there is no reason why all similar countries are not able to do the same. 
                                                          
7 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Biosecurity, “Bringing Cats 
and Dogs (and other pets) to Australia”. 27 June 2012. http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/cat-dogs   (accessed 
14 July 2012). 
8 Ibid.   
9 UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, “Quarantine”. 12 June 2012. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-pets/pets/travel/quarantine/ (accessed 26 June 2012). 
10 New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries: Biosecurity, “Your Pets”. 14 February 2012. 
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/enter/personal/pets  (accessed 14 July 2012).  If the argument in my 
essay is compelling, then even New Zealand legislation ought to be subjected to further review. 
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New Zealand is arguably one of the most pristine and disease free countries in the 
developed world - and the authorities would not risk their status through adopting 
presumed risky regulations. 
 
We are less likely to tolerate innocent people being incarcerated for extended periods for 
purely instrumental reasons, or as a means to an end (as animal quarantine is). Why 
then do we tolerate or allow this in the case of non-human animals? The fact that 
quarantine has largely been a ‘non-issue’ in the literature on ethics, and that it has thus 
far received very little criticism, indicates how low the moral status of animals is 
compared to humans. Either that, or quarantine is seen to constitute no harm. Human 
refugees kept in detention centres rightfully receive plenty of exposure and attention and 
are the cause of widely-publicised protests for their release.11 Interestingly, Australia’s 
treatment of its human refugees is analogous to their quarantine animals’.12 Asylum 
seekers to Australia are often kept in detention centres for months or years while their 
cases are decided. Although their plights could be seen to be similar, animals do not 
receive similar coverage or lobbying. It is my ambition to highlight this issue and to raise 
awareness of the discrepancy between human and animal treatment. In this way, I aim 
to make a novel contribution through this present research project. 
 
I intend to begin my essay by summarising the quarantine rules and regimes for various 
countries – including the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. After presenting the 
facts about quarantine, I will address objections to my argument – including a 
consequentialist response (which forms the strongest opposition to my case). Next, I will 
                                                          
11 Human Rights First, “Refugee Protection Program”.  No Date. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-
work/refugee-protection/  (accessed 26 June 2012). 
12 Australian Greens, “Immigration and Refugees”. No Date. http://greens.org.au/policies/care-for-
people/immigration-and-refugees  (accessed 26 June 2012). 
  Page 9 
present argument in defence of my thesis – including a discussion of interests and 
suffering in animals. Drawing support via the moral theories including deontology and 
virtue theory, I aim to strengthen my case. My argument most closely aligns with a 
deontological approach – as I feel that this theory is most robust in defence of the 
individual animal. Finally, before summing up with the conclusion, I will make 
recommendations for more effective, alternate policies.  
 
2 Companion Animal Quarantine – Some Issues and Facts 
 
In what follows, I summarise the animal quarantine policies of a few developed 
countries. These countries are among the main destinations for South Africans who 
intend to emigrate. Therefore, they are appropriate countries to study in regard to the 
subject of animal quarantine. While the main goal of quarantine is to avoid the 
introduction of disease in the target country, it appears that the number one concern 
globally is the issue of rabies being introduced or spread. A canvassing of the sundry 
country websites confirms this position. Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom are considered rabies-free. Canada and the United States do have incidences of 
rabies (but mainly in their wild animals – like raccoons, skunks and bats). In the US wild 
cases of rabies accounted for around 92% of cases reported in 2010.13 South Africa has a 
significant incidence of rabies in dogs and cats – this was evidenced by the 2010 outbreak 
and mass inoculation drive in Gauteng.14 This is the kind of situation that has led to 
South African companion animals needing longer quarantine periods when imported to 
                                                          
13 US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, “Rabies”. 15 November 2011. 
http://www.cdc.gov/rabies/location/usa/surveillance/index.html  (accessed 27 June 2012). 
14 South African Government Information, “Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(GDARD) act after two more rabies outbreak in western and southern suburbs of Johannesburg”. 3 
September 2010. http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=12694&tid=17163  
(accessed 27 June 2012). 
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Australia than pets from the UK or Canada. Companion animals in Australia are 
typically not inoculated against rabies, and there is a fear that if an animal with rabies 
was imported, it could cause problems for the local population of dogs and cats and also 
wildlife like kangaroos. In other words, it could affect life substantially in that country. 
This concern would obviously also extend to humans – since rabies can be transmitted to 
all mammals.15  
2.1 Quarantine in the United Kingdom 
Until very recently, the UK used to have very strict laws regarding quarantine for pets 
from those countries deemed to be a rabies risk. In fact their laws were similar to 
Australia’s and probably served as the template for Australia’s rules – as is the case for 
many other areas of the ex-colony’s policies. These animals would spend quite some 
time in quarantine. A system involving what was called the ‘Pet Passport’ was active – 
which meant that animals that had all their inoculations could avoid quarantine if they 
were coming from certain ‘approved’ countries. Pets from those countries considered a 
rabies risk (e.g. South Africa) were subject to around six months quarantine. Very 
recently, the UK has had to come in line with European Union standards - which meant 
that quarantine was effectively eliminated as from 1 January 2012. From this date 
onward, animals from all countries are permitted to enter the UK without quarantine, 
provided a checklist of prerequisites is completed. These include a rabies vaccination and 
a blood test performed thirty days after the vaccination for countries previously 
considered a rabies risk. The changes are summarised as follows: 
The UK will harmonise its pet movement rules with the rest of the European Union from 1 
January 2012, bringing the UK’s Pet Travel Scheme into line with the most recent science. The 
UK will maintain its high level of protection against animal diseases after the changes, which have 
the potential to save pet owners around £7 million in fees. Forcing pets to spend six months in 
                                                          
15 US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, “Animals and Rabies”. 20 January 2010. 
http://www.cdc.gov/rabiesandkids/animals.html  (accessed 28 June 2012). 
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quarantine, a practice dating from the 1800s, is no longer necessary because of vastly improved 
rabies vaccines and treatments … changes will ensure the risk of rabies coming to the UK remains 
extremely low. It’s estimated that the new rules mean there would be one case of rabies in a pet in 
the UK once every 211 years, with the possibility of a person dying from rabies obtained from a 
pet once in every 21,000 years.16 
Clearly, if there was any danger at all of introducing disease via the ‘relaxing’ of 
quarantine restrictions, then one can be quite sure the UK would not have acquiesced or 
agreed to harmonise. The figures quoted above highlight a number of important issues. 
Firstly, that thousands of animals are subject to the rigours of quarantine, in some 
countries, each year for the purpose of avoiding rabies in animals or in humans in the 
destination country. Secondly, a lengthy quarantine process is extremely costly. I would 
assume that Britain was brought into line, not because of any concern for the animals or 
their owners – but rather to make things easier for those bureaucrats charged with 
administering the systems across Europe. Somewhat ironically, it is not the palpable 
benefits to both non-humans and humans that are considered, but rather the complexity 
of managing more than one system. Happily, the side-effect of the change benefits the 
animal. It may also reduce the number of people attempting to cheat the system. 
According to the UK’s Environment Secretary, Caroline Spelman: 
The ‘UK’s quarantine system was designed to combat the threat of rabies in the 19th century and 
has now been left far behind by scientific advances. It’s time we changed these outdated rules 
which have caused hardship to generations of pets and pet owners, and those who rely on 
assistance dogs, with too many animals cooped up unnecessarily.17 
2.2 Quarantine in Canada 
Canada’s rabies cases do tend to fluctuate, but the trend is downward: from 670 cases (23 
dogs and 8 cats) in 2000 – the incidences are mainly in wild animals; 248 cases (12 dogs 
                                                          
16 UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, “New rules mean it will be easier and 
cheaper to travel abroad with pets”. 30 June 2011. http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2011/06/30/new-
rules-pet-passports/  (accessed 28 June 2012). 
17 Ibid. 
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and 4 cats) in 2005; 273 cases (7 dogs and 3 cats) in 2007; 128 cases (3 dogs and 4 cats) in 
2010; 114 cases (2 dogs and 4 cats) in 2011 and 75 cases (12 dogs and 1 cat) by June 
2012.18 Canada does not quarantine dogs and cats.19 Canada classifies requirements for 
animals entering according to a list of countries considered to be either rabies-free or not 
recognised as rabies-free. Dogs and cats are handled through a similar process. Animals 
from rabies-free countries do not need to have been inoculated against rabies. Animals 
from a country not considered rabies-free by Canada need to have a rabies vaccination 
certificate. This certificate lists information including when the animal was vaccinated, 
the drug used and how long the efficacy of the treatment is. Young animals are exempt 
from the rabies inoculation requirement.  
2.3 Quarantine in Australia 
Australia has a very rigorous and rigid quarantine procedure for dogs and cats being 
imported – perhaps the most stringent for any major country. Like many countries, 
Australia classifies import countries according to perceived rabies status. In response to 
the UK’s more relaxed rules from beginning 2012, all animals entering Australia from 
the UK will need evidence of rabies inoculation – which was not required previously as 
the UK was classified as rabies-free. Companion animals will still need to spend time in 
quarantine – unchanged at thirty days. Dogs and Cats from South Africa need to spend a 
minimum (not maximum) 210 days in quarantine – due to South Africa being seen as a 
higher rabies risk. Some of the quarantine time can be spent in an approved kennel in 
South Africa and around 3 months must be completed in Australia. Indeed, Australia 
                                                          
18 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, “Positive Rabies in Canada”. 20 August 2012. 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/rabrag/statse.shtml#a2012  (accessed 20 
September 2012). 
19 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, “Importing Domestic Dogs”. 14 August 2012. 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/imp/petani/canine.shtml (accessed 20 September 2012) and 
“Importing Domestic Cats”. 16 March 2012. 
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/imp/petani/feline.shtml  (accessed 28 June 2012). 
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advises that very young animals are not allowed through the quarantine process – 
contrast this with Canada exempting young animals altogether - and that older pets may 
not survive it. This is evidence that the whole process is very taxing on any animal. Dogs 
of seven years or older will need a veterinarian’s approval to board the flight – to 
establish that they are fit enough to handle quarantine. There is no real way to 
circumvent this situation, unless one first imports the pet to a third country (of a lesser 
rabies risk) for up to six months. Fortunately, dogs and cats from New Zealand are not 
subject to quarantine. It would therefore make sense to first take one’s pet to New 
Zealand for 3 months and then on to Australia. At least the pet would then spend 
comparatively little time in New Zealand quarantine.  
 
According to Biosecurity Australia, a review of the rabies requirements with regard to 
quarantine is currently underway, but there is no indication when a result could be 
expected (although a draft proposal is now available which is very similar to New 
Zealand’s policy).20 In the last ten years there has not been one case of rabies detected in 
quarantine – while each year approximately 8000 animals go through the quarantine 
process. The aim of quarantine for both the UK and Australia is ultimately the same – 
they both want to avoid the introduction of disease. The difference is that Australia does 
not have the pressure of a European Union being applied in order to standardise the 
procedures. Australia is, in effect, able to act unilaterally. People may argue that this is 
the prerogative of a sovereign state. But, if we believed that a sovereign state was 
violating human rights, this would be a justification for political, diplomatic, and 
perhaps even military intervention. Paradoxically, if we decide that animal interests are 
                                                          
20 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Biosecurity, “Review of 
importation of dogs and cats and their semen”. 05 September 2012. 
http://www.daff.gov.au/ba/ira/current-animal/dogs_and_cats (accessed 24 September 2012). 
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being infringed, there is no precedent – or any realisation that action could be taken. 
There is definitely a case for quarantine to be reduced in Australia. 
2.4 Quarantine in New Zealand 
As already indicated above, New Zealand’s requirements have recently become more 
relaxed than Australia’s. Previously, New Zealand had a quarantine regime similar to 
Australia’s. Since May 2011, dogs and cats need ‘only’ spend a minimum of ten days in 
quarantine if all their papers and inoculations are in order. This includes dogs and cats 
from South Africa. This change is positive for South African imports, but it has become 
stricter for those from the UK – since under the previous regime, there was no 
quarantine for pets from the UK. Now New Zealand has standardised imports from 
countries that are considered to have rabies under control. The pet needs an import 
permit and a post-arrival inspection. Candidate companion animals need to have 
evidence of anti-rabies treatment to be able to accompany their owners to New Zealand 
and must exhibit no signs of rabies on inspection. Source countries are categorised by 
status of being either rabies-free or having rabies well controlled. South Africa is one of 
the countries listed as having rabies well controlled. Interestingly, the ten day 
requirement is not for the purpose of detecting latent rabies – but for other reasons: 
Post-arrival quarantine requirements were previously based on rabies risk mitigation, although 
they also provided a “safety net” for other risks. The risk mitigation measures for rabies no longer 
include quarantine. However, the value of post-arrival quarantine was considered to allow time 
for a thorough inspection of the animal by an official veterinarian in a calm environment, time for 
engorgement of any ticks still present, a thorough documentation check, and confirmation of 
clinical health.21 
                                                          
21 New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries: Biosecurity, “Draft Import Health Standard for the 
Importation into New Zealand of Cats and Dogs from Approved Countries”. 31 March 2011. 
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/biosec/consult/review-submissions-ihs-cats-dogs.pdf , p. 5. 
(accessed 28 June 2012). 
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Australian animals are seen as less of a risk and will be examined at the border and if the 
animal passes then no quarantine is required. If the source country is not listed, pets 
from there are not eligible for direct import to New Zealand.22  Under these 
circumstances, a pet owner can move their pet to an ‘approved’ country for six months – 
or one can ‘submit a request for inclusion of a country or territory in a veterinary 
certificate for cats and dogs’.23 
 
A New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture case study on the risk of introducing rabies with 
the importation of dogs finds that:  
On the basis of this risk assessment it was concluded that vaccinated dogs imported without 
prolonged quarantine pose no greater risk of introducing rabies than dogs entering through 6 
month quarantine. Prolonged quarantine could thus be replaced by vaccination without any 
reduction in security, reducing significantly the cost of importation and eliminating the prolonged 
separation which was usually distressing for pets and their owner.24 
New Zealand regulations will be reviewed after two years to assess the impact. 
2.5 Quarantine in the United States 
The United States has a procedure similar to Canada’s – with some variation between 
the states. Companion animals to be imported need a valid rabies certificate and in the 
absence of this the importer will need to confine the animal until she can be immunized. 
Requirements state that ‘[d]ogs must have a certificate showing they have been 
                                                          
22 New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries: Biosecurity, “Import Health Standard for Cats and 
Dogs”. 16 December 2011. http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/ihs/catdog.gen.pdf , p. 4. (accessed 28 
June 2012). 
23 Ibid. 
24 MacDiarmid, S.C. and Corrin K.C., New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture, “Case Study: The Risk of 
Introducing Rabies through the Importation of Dogs”. No Date. 
http://freespace.virgin.net/simon.green/riskman.htm (accessed 28 June 2012). 
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vaccinated against rabies at least 30 days prior to entry into the United States. These 
requirements apply equally to service animals such as Seeing Eye dogs’.25 
2.6 Other Countries 
European Union countries have standardized their rules. There is no quarantine period if 
the animal’s papers are in order. Likewise, the quarantine situation in Asian and South 
American countries reflect a similar trend to most of the countries outlined above – they 
are concerned with rabies – but as long as the pet’s papers are in order, there is no 
quarantine period.26 
 
In light of all the above data, it is patently clear that the Australian standard is out of step 
with the other countries studied - and also in defiance of global trends. The aim of 
animal quarantine is the same or very similar for all countries – so why is the process so 
different for Australia? 
 
3 Arguments in Defence of  Quarantine 
 
In my opinion, the strongest objection to any reduction of quarantine requirements 
would originate from those who feel that such changes could allow disease to enter the 
destination country. In other words, the good of the local population of animals and 
humans is seen to be of greater importance than the welfare of relatively small numbers 
of quarantine animals. This kind of argument neatly corresponds to a consequentialist 
justification – that is, one in which the aggregate consequences of any action are seen as 
the most important factor to consider when making a moral decision. This concern is 
                                                          
25 US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, “Bringing a Dog into the United States”. 6 August 
2012. http://www.cdc.gov/animalimportation/dogs.html (accessed 22 September 2012). 
26 LetsGoPets.com, “International Pet Travel Regulations”. 2012. 
http://www.letsgopets.com/inttravel.php# (accessed 28 June 2012). 
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obviously valid and powerful. Yet, I will argue that making changes that benefit those 
animals destined for quarantine does not necessitate compromising the health of local 
animals and humans.  
 
A second, albeit less powerful, consequentialist argument in favour of quarantine 
originates from those whose livelihood is dependent on the animal quarantine business. 
These people benefit monetarily through the quarantine process and would oppose the 
regime being altered to their detriment. I will also consider this objection, somewhat 
more briefly. 
 
A third major argument in favour of quarantine is one which claims that animals are not 
due any moral consideration and therefore that we are not obligated to reduce their time 
spent in quarantine. There are some contemporary philosophers of this viewpoint, even 
though they may be in the minority. This objection to reducing quarantine periods 
corresponds to an argument that we should not consider animals in decisions that affect 
their welfare.  
3.1 Consequentialist Objections to Reducing Quarantine 
The chief objection is that foreign governments are primarily interested in preventing any 
diseases that could affect their local pets, wildlife and livestock.27 Obviously these policy 
makers could be even more concerned should such a threat affect humans. One would 
imagine that the threat of introducing diseases like avian influenza or SARS could easily 
unsettle policy makers. Governments could argue that following the Precautionary 
Principle28 would motivate against relaxing quarantine laws. Succinctly, this principle 
                                                          
27  UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, “Quarantine”. 7 September 2012. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-pets/pets/travel/quarantine/  (accessed 22 September 2012). 
28 Van De Veer, D. and Pierce, C. Eds. 2003. “The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book”, p. 618. 
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states that if there is any risk of a threat, then changes would be hard to justify. So, any 
motivation for reducing quarantine would need to be backed-up by evidence that 
proposed changes do not constitute a threat. Essentially, this principle does not deny 
moral obligations to the animals (or their owners) in quarantine – it just prioritises our 
obligation to larger groups of animals and humans. In a country like Australia that has 
unique and emblematic fauna this concern is especially pertinent. This unease is 
encapsulated in the following quote from the Australian Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Farming:  
If rabies became established in Australia the disease could profoundly change our way of 
life. Rabies could be very difficult to eradicate if it became established in native wildlife. If dogs 
and cats became infected then it would be necessary for pet owners to regularly vaccinate their 
pets. Australia[n]’s would need to be alert to risks from stray cats and dogs. All imported animals 
are subject to strict quarantine requirements, including vaccination for dogs and cats from all 
affected countries.29 
 Indeed a potentially serious situation that should not be risked or broached at all. The 
last thing I would be recommending is something that would constitute a risk to this 
status. Interestingly, a Canadian website calls into question Australia’s putative rabies-
free status – because bat-transmitted rabies (lyssavirus) is present.30 If this is the case, the 
Australian quarantine case is a straw-man argument. That is, they are doing their best to 
prevent something that is already present. But, the important question to consider here is 
whether or not the changing of quarantine requirements would lead to any increased risk 
to Australian wildlife (or humans). Any argument promoting such a scenario would be 
indefensible – unless in exceptional circumstances. My motivation is based on the 
premise that a reduction in quarantine would be at least as effective as the current regime. 
                                                          
29 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Rabies”. 21 June 2011. 
http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health/pests-diseases-weeds/animal/rabies  (accessed 29 June 
2012). 
30 Public Health Agency of Canada, “Rabies Virus”. 19 April 2011. http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/lab-
bio/res/psds-ftss/rab-eng.php  (accessed 26 June 2012). 
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This argument is based on solid supporting evidence from other countries with a 
significant history of not quarantining animals.  The premise is that an emphasis on 
prevention and technological advancements has rendered long quarantine periods 
effectively redundant. In fact, in Australia’s case, eliminating quarantine ten years ago 
would not have allowed even one case of rabies to enter the country – according to its 
own figures (see Quarantine in Australia section).  
 
The consequentialist would have to concede that putting so many pets through 
unnecessary suffering cannot be justified if there is close to a zero chance of any humans 
or animals becoming infected with rabies. This is true especially if the local population is 
indifferent to changes – and so their utility or happiness is unaffected no matter what the 
quarantine regime of the day encompasses. If there is no heightened threat to local 
populations, there could be no lowered utility. Therefore the only consequences to 
consider when making a decision are for those animals and humans directly impacted by 
quarantine. This means a consequentialist justification need only consider how those 
subjects in the quarantine process would be best off - either retaining the status quo or 
eliminating quarantine. No doubt the consequences or happiness of those impacted 
would be best if there was no quarantine. Additionally, Tom Regan argues that, other 
things being equal, animals have not only interests but also rights that should not be 
violated.31 Regan would argue that the violation of the individual’s interests in 
quarantine would not be justified by deferring to the greater good of maintaining a 
disease free status for the larger local population. 
 
                                                          
31 Regan, T. 2003. “The Case for Animal Rights”. In VanDeVeer, D & Pierce, C. , pp. 143-149. 
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Another strong objection to this consequentialist position makes mention of the fact that 
disability assistance dogs are generally permitted to circumvent the quarantine process if 
their paperwork is in order. Presumably, then, there is no threat from certain dogs. But 
this points to a discrepancy in the system. Surely a uniform approach is not only needed; 
it is logical. If seeing-eye dogs can be accorded special and different treatment – in fact, 
most times they can accompany owners on the same flight – then why are companion 
animals not given the same treatment?32 
 
A second consequentialist objection to the elimination of quarantine would originate 
from people who are economic beneficiaries of the whole process. This would apply to 
people who run the kennels and those employed in the quarantine departments and 
associated businesses. It is rather expensive and labour-intensive to put a pet through the 
quarantine process.33 The approximate cost is around ten thousand ZAR34 per animal per 
month in quarantine. If we consider that around eight thousand animals are put through 
quarantine each year, we are talking about a huge industry. (Please note that the figures 
quoted do not cover the additional cost of relocating the pet.) If quarantine is eliminated, 
the livelihood of those in the business will be affected and some roles may be lost. This 
argument is, however, analogous to the consideration that animal experimentation 
should continue, because of its benefits to those employed in the research sciences, 
pharmaceutical industry, etc. This objection is not as strong or compelling as the 
previous – because it is difficult to prioritise the monetary gain of relatively few 
                                                          
32 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Disability Assistance 
Dogs”. 01 August 2012. http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/cat-dogs/assistance  (accessed 22 September 2012). 
33 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Quarantine station 
accommodation & fees”. 07 May 2012. http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/cat-dogs/accom (accessed 29 June 
2012). 
34 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Fees for government 
animal quarantine stations for cats and dogs”. 05 July 2012. http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/cat-
dogs/accom/govt-stations (accessed 22 September 2012). 
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individuals at the expense of great deals of animals and their owners suffering 
unnecessarily. Any benefit gained from running the process would not neutralise the 
pain that the pets and their owners experience. This is because there may be multiples of 
pets (and owners) who are inconvenienced per person employed in the process.  
 
Paradoxically, if quarantine times were reduced (as in the case of New Zealand) then 
more pet owners may be prepared to import their animals as the cost and stress involved 
would be far less. I am now considering taking my dog via New Zealand to Australia 
because I feel that ten days would be manageable for her. Not that I vouch for even short 
times in quarantine (as there is no need for quarantine), but this could translate to 
continued business for those employed in the quarantine industry.  Therefore, this 
objection is not a sound justification to continue with the current regime. I now turn to 
the third objection to my argument and this is around the consideration of animals as 
beneficiaries of moral decisions – or of animals enjoying moral standing. 
3.2 Moral Standing Objections to Reducing Quarantine 
For a person or animal to have moral standing presupposes that she is able to be affected 
either positively or negatively by a moral agent making a choice and that we take their 
welfare into consideration when making a moral choice. This means that the being 
involved is at least a moral subject. Kai Horsthemke argues that animals have moral 
subject status and that they have standing equal to human subjects.35 Some philosophers 
deny that animals are due moral consideration in decisions that affect their welfare. 
According to them we are not obligated to consider them when we make decisions about 
quarantine.  
 
                                                          
35 Horsthemke, K. 2010. “The Moral Status and Rights of Animals”, p. 159. 
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Two leading philosophers who are renowned for their anthropocentric stance are 
Michael P.T. Leahy and R.G. Frey. Although these philosophers do not accord interests 
or rights to animals, they are a minority amongst philosophers contemporarily. Their 
arguments would correspond to a Kantian viewpoint that animals only deserve to be 
treated as a means to an end and not as ends in themselves.36 They deny animals any 
moral standing. Although Leahy – who takes a more hard line approach than Frey - would 
not condone unnecessary suffering of animals, his philosophy is that animals would not 
suffer to the degree humans do because they are not self-conscious to the degree that 
humans are – mainly as a result of not being able to use human language37. Despite the 
fact that he concedes he is no expert in animal physiology and is a philosopher rather, he 
nevertheless does make some claims about how animals experience (or do not 
experience) things like pain and suffering. He does not deny that animals are sentient, 
but maintains that there is a supreme degree of difference between humans and other 
animals. His claim that the possession of moral status depends on the ability to vocalise 
language is countered by the argument from marginal cases.38  
 
Alternatively, we could counter his argument by considering the following thought 
experiment. Imagine that we are visited by a sophisticated alien species which 
communicates through telepathy and whose intelligence is far greater than humans. 
How can any ability to suffer be reduced to the facility to verbalise any such suffering? 
His argument is far-fetched. Any person who has owned a pet could vouch for that pet’s 
suffering when she becomes injured – sometimes the incomprehension of the situation 
                                                          
36 Rachels, J. and S. 2010.  “The Elements of Moral Philosophy”, p. 137. 
37 Leahy, M.P.T. 1994. “Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective”, p. 237.  
38 Succinctly, the argument from marginal cases is concerned with humans who are on the margins of 
human normality. This could include infants or the intellectually challenged. While few would question 
their claim to moral status and dignity, these candidates would not pass Leahy’s criterion for moral 
standing. 
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makes it worse than when one is able to explain things to a human victim. The most 
Leahy would probably concede is that we owe animals indirect duties via their human 
companions.  
 
In Chapter 8 of his book “Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective” - in which 
he discusses zoos amongst other topics - Leahy makes mention of the fact that objections 
to animals being so housed would consist in the fact that their ‘animal nature is 
frustrated by captivity’.39 And, although he mentions Marian Stamp Dawkins’ signs of 
animal suffering and James Rachels’ claim that animals have a right to liberty40, his 
conclusion is that an animal cannot object to being incarcerated against her will like a 
human can because she lacks self-consciousness.41 Kevin Behrens writes about Leahy 
‘[a]rguing that animals lack the capacity for language, moral agency and self-
consciousness and are thus not subjects of moral responsibility’.42  Even if animals are 
not self-conscious to the degree that humans are, this does not preclude them being 
moral subjects. They still have some awareness of their life situation. Otherwise they 
would not survive and thrive. Therefore, it does not follow that we can discount taking 
their needs into account when making decisions that compromise their interests or 
welfare – they can still have a claim to moral consideration.  
 
Horsthemke claims that philosophers who deny moral standing to animals tend to 
concentrate on arbitrary differences - like the ability to speak - between us and animals to 
limit moral consideration, while at the same time ‘ignoring significant and relevant 
                                                          
39 Leahy, M.P.T. 1994, p. 236. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, p.237. 
42 Behrens, K. 2009.  “Tony Yengeni’s Ritual Slaughter: Animal Anti-Cruelty vs. Culture”, South African 
Journal of Philosophy, 28(3), p. 278. 
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similarities that exist between us. The failure to extend the benefits of morality, or 
general moral principles, to members of other species is both inconsistent and biased.’43 
These similarities include qualities like our complex nervous systems and anatomy. 
 
Frey argues against animals being accorded any interests, as he reiterates in the 
postscript to his book “Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals”.44 But most 
interestingly, he also denies rights to humans in relation to animals, especially the right 
to treat animals the way we currently do – including keeping them in zoos or using them 
for experiments or for food, and that,  
we have no moral right to an animal’s confinement in zoos, to its ceaseless drudgery and 
labour on our behalf, to its persistent exploitation in the name of cosmetics, clothing, 
entertainment, and sport, to its blindness, dismemberment, and ultimate death in the 
name of science, and, to be sure, to its appearance on our dining-tables.45 
 
Judging from this quote, it would be hard to imagine him condoning quarantine. He 
likens the denial of interests to animals to denying women the right to abortion on 
demand – but emphasises that this does not leave animals (or women) powerless.46 So, in 
effect he is according similar moral standing to animals and humans, albeit in a 
somewhat oblique way.  
 
Despite their anthropocentric viewpoints, both Leahy and Frey appear to grant that 
animals, like humans, are able to suffer, feel pain and experience deprivation. Since most 
contemporary philosophers (including Peter Singer and Regan) attribute moral standing 
to animals, the onus of justifying their viewpoint has shifted to those who maintain a 
                                                          
43 Horsthemke, K. 2010, p. 145. 
44 Frey, R.G. 1980. “Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals”, pp. 168-171. 
45 Ibid, pp. 169-170. 
46 Ibid. 
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morally anthropocentric position – and who deny animals’ moral standing. It is, 
therefore, neither implausible nor unfeasible to grant that companion animals should be 
the direct recipients of certain moral obligations.  
 
Interestingly, the two major objections that I have discussed in effect negate each other, 
or work in opposite directions. Philosophers who feel that animals are not deserving of 
moral consideration would, by definition, not be worried about the welfare of the local 
populations of animals and wildlife (even if they are very concerned about human 
populations contracting diseases). They would therefore argue that quarantine is not 
needed if there is no threat to humans. And, if local animals happened to succumb to 
disease, this is not something that should be prevented at all costs. The consequentialist, 
on the other hand, would take issue with those who claim animals are undeserving of 
consideration because consequentialists are concerned with outcomes that deliver the 
best consequences overall – and include animals in their utility calculations. The 
consequentialist position therefore presupposes that animals are holders of moral 
standing. 
 
As a final consideration, one could also raise the issue that there would be critics of my 
thesis due to the fact that most countries have moved (or are moving) forward from a 
quarantine regime – and I may be effectively conducting a straw-man argument. Despite 
this progress being positive news, there are still some laggards like Australia that do 
maintain onerous quarantine periods. To be sure, if these countries changed their 
policies, there would be some basis to this criticism, but while their rules are in place, my 
argument remains valid. Additionally, even if all quarantine is ended, my argument will 
remain in force if one considers that despite the fact that slavery has mostly been 
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abolished (and partly because people opposed it once it became economically unviable), 
the moral case against slavery retains its force. These types of practices need to be 
condemned (even after they are ended) so that there is no possibility for them to recur. 
 
4 Animal Interests and Animal Suffering 
 
Moral standing can be related to the possession of interests – interests ‘define the 
conditions under which [a creature] flourishes or languishes’.47 This implies that if a 
creature possesses interests, we may have moral obligations toward her. It would be hard 
to deny that the kind of animals that are routinely quarantined have interests. Most 
contemporary philosophers would accord interests to dogs and cats. Any being that acts 
for the good of its own welfare or has desires displays an interest. Animals will not 
normally put themselves in situations of danger, and they usually act in accordance with 
maintaining their own well-being (as an example, many animals moved to higher ground 
before the Indonesian tsunami struck in 2004). In other words, they have an interest in 
preserving their welfare – just like humans do. According to Horsthemke: 
Animals, like human beings, have interests. They are centres of experience, 
subjects of a life. They are individuals who have, and in some cases even take, an 
interest in living. Their lives can be better or worse for them. They can be made to 
suffer, and be helped as well as be harmed. Finally, many are capable of enjoying 
their lives. Therefore, it is not implausible to say that they matter morally and to 
regard them as morally considerable individuals.48 
 
When animal and human interests conflict (for example when we use animals for food) 
we usually have a situation where the interests of the animals are overridden. Putting 
                                                          
47 Horsthemke, K. 2010, p. 47. 
48 Ibid, p. 50. 
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companion animals in quarantine is an example of the animal’s interests being ignored 
or being subjugated to human interests. Time in quarantine constitutes a time of 
languishing for animals rather than flourishing, no doubt. Animals have an interest in 
freedom, rather than in being caged. This is supported by the fact that animals in zoos 
and enclosures are often stressed, will not breed as successfully and may live shorter 
lives.49 In fact, it is even possible that the time in quarantine is a time of suffering for the 
animal. While animals cannot articulate or verbalise their interests, they are able to 
display their preferences – and this may also give us an indication that the animal is 
suffering. Animals will not subject themselves to pain unnecessarily and will move away 
from a pain stimulus. When my dog was a puppy, she shocked her nose on the electric 
fence. She was obviously in great distress and squealed, ran away and urinated on the 
ground. She is now extremely wary of the fence and avoids the area. She knows that 
chancing another encounter with the fence is not in her interest.  
 
In the quarantine situation, animals’ interests are closely intertwined with their owner’s 
interests. The owner’s interests would be compromised, because it would involve being 
isolated from the pet for an extended period of time. Human owners are negatively 
affected by being separated from the pet – since it is analogous to being apart from a 
family member. No pet owner would volunteer to have a pet put in quarantine. We do it 
because we do not (seem to) have a choice or an alternative. 
 
It is widely accepted that all beings (human or animal) should not suffer gratuitously. 
We therefore need to address the issue of whether or not animals in quarantine suffer 
through their experience. This is important to know if we wish to make an informed 
                                                          
49 Regan, T. and Singer, P. eds. 1976. “Animal Rights and Human Obligations”, p. 210. 
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decision about quarantine. If the animal does indeed suffer, the case against quarantine 
is much stronger. Furthermore, if there is any doubt at all about whether a creature 
suffers unnecessarily through contact with any experience, then we are morally obliged 
to avoid the situation – since the being in question needs to be given the benefit of the 
doubt. Therefore, only if we are one hundred percent certain that the animal does not 
suffer at all (or at least not unnecessarily) can we consider quarantine tolerable – 
especially since there are alternatives that have proven (at least as) effective as 
quarantine.  
4.1 Do Animals in Quarantine Suffer? 
Marian Stamp Dawkins is an authority on the scientific determination of animal 
discomfort. In her book “Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare”, she details 
the symptoms that animals exhibit through the experiences of stress, distress and 
suffering.50 ‘Stress’ is the term used to refer to physiological changes ‘that take place [in 
the animal] whenever animals are subjected to a wide range of conditions and situations, 
such as overcrowding, [or] repeated attacks by a member of their own species’51 for 
example. These changes that could take place are a heightened heart rate or adrenaline 
secretion into the blood. I think most people would have heard about animals being 
transported to slaughter having to deal with more stress than usual – especially 
overcrowding. ‘Distress’, which may not necessarily be harmful to an animal, causes the 
animal to respond in a way that may interfere with its well-being, comfort, and /or 
reproduction, with possible consequences of overt pathologic changes.52 In other words, 
when an animal becomes stressed, it may act in uncharacteristic, distressed ways. An 
example of this could be an animal going to slaughter trying to climb a fence in order to 
                                                          
50 Stamp Dawkins, M. 1980. “Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare”, ch. 6. 
51 Stamp Dawkins, in Singer, P. ed. 2006. “In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave”, ch. 2. 
52 Clark, J.D., Rager, D.R., and Calpin, J.P. 1997. “Animal Well-Being II. Stress and Distress”, Laboratory 
Animal Science, 47(6), p. 571. 
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escape the situation. Dawkins defines ‘suffering’ as an experience that is both unpleasant 
and extreme.53 In our example, an animal at the slaughterhouse would no doubt suffer 
through the experience of long transport to the destination, possibly in overcrowded and 
unpleasant conditions, with little access to clean air and water.  
 
Dawkins evaluates a number of comparative tests to establish whether or not an animal 
suffers. These tests include comparisons to peers in the wild; comparison to human 
behaviour under similar circumstances and also symptoms of animal thriving. Obviously 
none are definitive since we cannot hope to get inside an animal’s head to know how she 
feels, but taken together, or collectively, the signs and tests can be useful in forming a 
coherent case that the animal does suffer. The three symptoms indicative of suffering are 
the animal’s health, physiological signs and behavioral evidence. Dawkins later refines 
her definition of suffering to being something that an animal would work hard to avoid if 
she were given the choice.54 She distinguishes between unnecessary and necessary 
suffering in animals (in other words, suffering for no gain as opposed to suffering for 
greater benefit - for example, an injection for prevention of rabies) and she points to us 
imagining ourselves in their skins in order to get an idea of how animals may be 
feeling.55 If a dog presents well and has bright eyes and a glossy coat and is eating well – 
she is presumably not suffering. If the dog is listless, with dull eyes and off her food, she 
is no doubt not content – and may possibly be suffering. 
 
Suffering is often linked to pain, but this need not necessarily be the case. Even if the 
animal does not suffer physically, she can still be suffering mentally. In the case of 
                                                          
53 Stamp Dawkins, in Singer, P. ed. 2006, ch. 2. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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quarantine, the animal ‘suffers’ in that a significant portion of her life is wasted while 
people examine whether or not the animal is carrying any diseases. Therefore, the 
animal would quite possibly work hard to avoid this kind of situation and may even go 
off her food in quarantine. Companion animals often return from kennels sick and could 
even return with an illness colloquially called ‘kennel cough’.56 Kennel cough is a serious 
condition and if not treated it can be passed other animals or cause the demise of the 
animal. This is clearly a cause of suffering for the pet.  
 
The suffering an animal experiences in quarantine may manifest in ‘distress’ behaviour 
like pacing, or uncharacteristic repetitive-style actions in the animal. Imagine a lion 
captive in a small cage in a zoo for years. The animal may start to exhibit non-
characteristic or abnormal behaviour – called stereotypies - like pacing or shaking his 
head continually.57 She would, in short, begin to display some symptoms of mental 
illness or distress.58 The same can be said for dogs – we are all aware of dogs that are 
overly aggressive, too timid or hyperactive.59 All of these are symptoms of an animal that 
has suffered some sort of psychological damage and they may suffer like this in 
quarantine. In Australia, animals in quarantine are permitted visitors – but the times and 
hours are not very convenient. It differs from facility to facility, but typically one would 
be permitted to visit only for a couple of hours on certain weekdays. Visits are generally 
not permitted on weekends or public holidays. This would mean that some working 
                                                          
56 Kennel cough is a highly contagious canine illness characterized by inflammation of the upper 
respiratory system. It can be caused by viral infections such as canine distemper, canine adenovirus, canine 
parainfluenza virus, or canine respiratory coronavirus, or bacterial infections such as Bordetella 
bronchiseptica.[1] It is so named because the infection can spread quickly among dogs, such as in the close 
quarters of a kennel - see Wikipedia, “Kennel Cough”. 12 September 2012. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kennel_cough  (accessed 22 September 2012). 
57 Gruen, L. 2011. “Animals and Ethics”, p.137. 
58 Horsthemke, K. 2010, p. 60. 
59 See Stamp Dawkins (passim). 
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people may not be able to visit their pets during the whole quarantine period. This would 
no doubt add significantly to any stress the animals are subjected to.  
 
While the animal is in quarantine, she is usually confined to a fairly small cage. She is 
permitted to be exercised in a communal yard - this is up to the visitor or a hired dog-
walker to do. Staff may exercise the animal every few days – but it does not sound like 
this is enforced, or can be relied upon.60 Further evidence of suffering would be provided 
by monitoring the animal’s demeanor and condition during and after the quarantine 
period. But, as I have stated above, physical symptoms are not needed to determine that 
the animal has suffered – it also bears the mental scars of a period of forced 
incarceration. Even if the physical environment of the station is not a cause of suffering 
for the animal, the separation of the animal from its owner would cause suffering – as it 
would for the pet’s owner too. Since it would be almost impossible to prove that an 
animal does not suffer, we owe it to the animal not to put it through the experience. 
 
If animals can display signs of mental stress, we can infer that they are capable of 
suffering psychologically - even if it is not the same as human suffering.61 Mental stress 
can be seen as a form of suffering. Animal suffering may not only be limited to being 
raised and killed for food or vivisection. Sentient beings, by definition, can suffer by 
living in strange and possibly cramped conditions for months on end – ‘they suffer both 
physically and psychologically, and they have their interests in liberty frustrated’.62 They 
may not understand how long this confinement would last, and while this lack of a sense 
                                                          
60 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Quarantine station 
accommodation & fees”. 07 May 2012. http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/cat-dogs/accom (accessed 29 June 
2012). 
61 Singer, P. ed. 2006. “In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave”, ch. 2. 
62 Gruen, L. 2011, p. 174. 
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of time and duration may also be seen as a fortunate thing, it is arguably (and empirical 
evidence appears to confirm this) time spent pining as they see their human companions 
less frequently than usual. Most pet owners would attest that their animal companions 
pine if they are away for the day – so experiencing the double stress of physical / 
geographic relocation and of isolation could be an enormously trying time for the 
animal. This stressful period would be compounded the longer it endures. This 
phenomenon has been identified as separation anxiety. While not all dogs exhibit this 
condition, for those affected it may be an unpleasant and extreme experience. Since we 
cannot be sure how animals do experience this phenomenon, it is possible that this is a 
time of suffering for the animal. Indeed, it may be a time of mental stress or 
psychological suffering.63 
 
Within the pro-animal literature, there are obviously disparate views on what kind of 
treatment constitutes suffering in animals, what is considered harm, and – especially – 
what our responses ought to be. Consequentialist (i.e. utilitarian) philosophers like 
Singer argue that as long as animals do not suffer, they are not harmed64 and that in 
situations where harm is unavoidable, on aggregate, the harms may not outweigh the 
overall benefits. Singer attributes interests to animals on the basis of the ability to feel 
pain. Since animals are possibly suffering unnecessarily in quarantine, Singer would not 
approve of the situation. Still other philosophers – like Lori Gruen - maintain that 
considerations of suffering (and of corresponding utility and rights) are insufficient to 
account for the subtleties in our moral interactions with nonhuman animals, placing the 
                                                          
63 The Humane Society of the United States, “Separation Anxiety”. 3 November 2009.  
http://www.humanesociety.org/animals/dogs/tips/separation_anxiety.html  (accessed 29 June 2012). 
64 Singer, P. 2009, p. 160. 
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emphasis instead on caring, compassion and companionship65 - which echo virtue ethical 
theory. 
 
The fact is that humans are (normally) able to articulate thoughts to express their 
physical and emotional state and that this is something that animals generally lack. For 
some reason, this ability to communicate how an individual feels has come to be seen as 
equivalent to being able to experience this state.66 No one would deny that a person unable 
to communicate their physical and psychological distress is able to feel pain and 
experience deprivation – so on what grounds do we withhold the benefit of the doubt 
from animals with comparably complex nervous systems? Animals may not be able to 
express themselves in any human language, but some humans also lack this facility. It 
could be seen as speciesist to accord feelings only to human beings who are unable to 
verbalise them, but to deny them in relevantly similar situations to non-human beings.  
 
Animals usually communicate physically and through body language rather than 
through speech. But dogs can bark, growl, yelp, squeal, howl or whine. Cats will purr, 
hiss, meow or screech. We have a fairly reliable idea of their intention when these 
vocalisations are made, although they are not using human speech. Additionally, 
animals could bite or scratch in response to a negative situation, or they could also move 
away to avoid a negative stimulus. Even human communication is often more reliable 
via body language than through speech. I could fairly easily say that I feel fine – but my 
demeanour could convey that I am not happy and feel ill. The use of language does not 
presuppose consciousness or having feelings. Humans developed sophisticated languages 
                                                          
65 Gruen, L. 2011, pp. 155 - 158. 
66 Frey, R.G. 1980, pp. 89 - 100. 
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to communicate these emotions to others, not as evidence of possessing such capacities 
or feelings in the first place.  
 
Philosophers who believe that animals are not able to feel pain – that they are merely 
automata that perform like machines – are misguided. This Cartesian67 view can be 
easily refuted via the evidence that animals are able to get ill and then recover of their 
own accord. I think most people have witnessed an ill dog – hence the term ‘sick as a 
dog’. If dogs were machines, they would not easily get sick. Cartesian philosophers liken 
animals getting sick to machines failing. But when machines malfunction they are not 
able to subsequently fix themselves. If animals are able to get sick, they are able to be 
harmed. In addition, unlike machines, animals are able to reproduce – just like humans 
do. This is evidence that animals are closer to humans than they are to machines.  
 
Therefore, if animals are able to suffer, we are obligated to cause them no gratuitous 
harm. Further proof that animals are in fact able to feel pain (perhaps more acutely so 
than humans since they may not understand how long it will last) is that it is a necessary 
evolutionary quality.68 Animals who cannot feel pain would not survive or evolve – since 
pain-perception is instrumental in avoiding danger. If it were not present, animals would 
not be motivated to avoid danger – they would be too brave. Maintaining that animals 
cannot feel pain makes me think of a situation about people who are being operated on 
and who have had ineffective anaesthetic. They are conscious and feel everything but 
cannot move and cannot speak. I can think of nothing more awful and yet this is 
probably the case for animals sometimes. They are constrained and are suffering – but 
cannot tell us. We clearly do not give them sufficient benefit of the doubt. 
                                                          
67 Horsthemke, K. 2010, pp. 19 – 22. 
68 Horsthemke, K. 2010, p. 23. 
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5 Arguments in Defence of  Thesis 
5.1 Question and Thesis Statement 
‘Are we morally obliged to eliminate / at least substantially minimise companion animal 
quarantine?’  
 
As far as I can ascertain from my research on the topic, this research question is an 
original one that has not been addressed previously in the literature on animals and 
ethics. In addition, I believe that the topic is unique from a philosophical (i.e. applied 
ethics) perspective. Most questions around animals’ deprivation of freedom are related to 
intensive farming, zoos, wildlife sanctuaries or even their lives as (domesticated) pets.69 
The moral issue faced here is around the experience of animals forced into quarantine by 
government policies that may be out of touch not only with the demand for respect for 
animal life and well-being, but also with what are (and what are not) reasonable 
requirements of health and safety.  
 
The more I read about animal abuse and the ways in which humans use animals, the 
more I realise that most times we try to ignore the processes that put meat on the plate, 
or shampoo in the bottle. How can sensitive, good people acquiesce to the kinds of 
wrongs being committed to satisfy our acquired tastes and preferences? Have we become 
so desensitised to the suffering that we tend to discount the connection between animal 
and product? Humans’ right to a comfortable life is deemed sacred while animals’ is 
deemed (relatively) worthless and is regularly violated. I feel that sometimes the key to 
addressing egregious wrongs is to divide and conquer - as it were. If people become 
aware that something as seemingly innocuous as quarantine actually involves harm to 
                                                          
69 Gruen, L. 2011, ch. 5. 
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animals, then they could become aware that things like raising animals for food is an 
even greater harm. 
 
My thesis is that we are obliged to eliminate or substantially minimise animal 
quarantine. My argument is that there are more effective (and less harmful) ways to 
achieve the aim of safeguarding local animal populations from any threat of disease due 
to importation of foreign dogs or cats. Animal quarantine has a long history and in 
certain ways is as anachronistic as Ellis Island70 was for human migrants. We would not 
tolerate such an institution today – and rightly so - but presumably it was seen as more 
acceptable last century. Perhaps people felt they had no choice in going through the 
immigration process. I would assume that people living in those times saw that regime as 
the necessary evil of seeking a new life in immigrating to the United States. Today we 
would see this as a compromise of human interests – just like incarceration of the 
innocent. This kind of treatment has been replaced today by people taking a medical in 
their home country before the immigrant is granted a visa. While the aim is the same, 
the method is more humane and less invasive. Attitudes and levels of acceptance have 
changed as people have become more empowered and emancipated. Establishment of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights71 have focused a 
spotlight on the treatment of people globally. Today an institution like Ellis Island would 
be seen as an abuse of human dignity. Imagine being scrutinised for diseases - and 
possibly being turned back to the old country like a person with Hansen’s disease.  
                                                          
70 Ellis Island opened in 1892 as a federal immigration station, a purpose it served for more than 60 years 
(it closed in 1954). Millions of newly arrived immigrants passed through the station during that time - in 
fact, it has been estimated that close to 40 percent of all current U.S. citizens can trace at least one of their 
ancestors to Ellis Island – see History.com, “Ellis Island”. 1996 – 2012. 
http://www.history.com/topics/ellis-island  (accessed 29 June 2012). 
71 United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. No Date. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/  (accessed 29 June 2012). 
  Page 37 
 
While human and animal quarantine are not the same, there are nevertheless parallels. If 
we have moved on to more humane methods for humans, is it acceptable to retain an 
analogous regime for our pets – when our technology has advanced to the point of 
making quarantine unnecessary? Companion animals are subjects of a life and like 
humans and other sentient beings, they are able to suffer. While animals are suffering, 
we are obligated to act to end that suffering. Therefore, quarantine belongs in the last 
century – just like Ellis Island. 
 
In addition to the issues of animals suffering or having their interests infringed in 
quarantine, there are two vital and related, largely empirical questions that also need to 
be answered. These are: firstly, what is the purpose or aim of quarantine? And, secondly, 
how effective is quarantine in achieving this aim? Once we get answers to these two 
questions, the debate can be framed in a coherent and consistent fashion. If we 
understand the purpose of quarantine, we may be able to suggest alternatives. 
Additionally, if we are able to determine how well quarantine meets this aim, we may be 
able to suggest more effective alternatives.  
 
As indicated previously, the selected government websites indicate that the purpose of 
quarantine is to avoid the threat of disease being introduced to local animal (and human) 
populations via the import of animals from foreign countries. Rabies is the chief disease 
(or threat) governments want to avoid. How effective quarantine is in averting disease 
can only be established by looking at statistics. One can refer to statistics on how many 
cases of rabies have been detected in animals held in quarantine over the past few years – 
in order to get an idea of how effective quarantine is. If no (or few) cases of rabies are 
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detected in the thousands of animals going through quarantine over the years, then by 
implication, it is hard to justify quarantine on these grounds. If many cases are discovered, 
then there is proportionately greater justification. The figures from Australia quoted 
above indicate no cases of rabies detected in the last ten years in quarantine. This means 
that for approximately 80 000 animals, each spending from one to around seven months 
in quarantine and not one case of rabies detected, there is a lot of suffering for no 
obvious result. In other words, in addition to engaging in the moral debate, we may also 
be able to look to more practical means to remedy the situation and suggest more caring 
and, indeed, more economical alternatives. 
 
There are different ideas on how humans could incur moral obligations to other animals. 
The three most common criteria or capacities that are used to determine whether or not 
animals have moral standing are sentience, rationality and autonomy.72 I think the least 
controversial of the three attributes that could be used for companion animals is 
sentience, as it would be harder to argue that such animals are rational or autonomous. 
Most philosophers grant that sentient73 animals should not suffer unnecessarily, and that 
they do have (at least some minimal) moral standing. Since most, if not all, companion 
animals would qualify as sentient beings by any measure, we are, therefore, morally 
obliged to avoid any unnecessary suffering they may be exposed to. If we can achieve the 
aim of avoiding the introduction of disease into a country without causing any suffering, 
then we should choose that alternative. From the research I have undertaken, I am 
convinced that quarantine does indeed cause an animal unnecessary suffering – because 
the aim can generally be achieved without placing animals in quarantine. 
                                                          
72 Regan, T. and Singer, P. 1976, p. 8.  
73 Sentient – ‘having the power of perception by the sense; conscious’ – Dictionary.com, “Sentient”. 2012. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sentient  (accessed 29 June 2012). 
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Immigrant humans arguably represent a threat to the health of local populations too. 
Certain governments do restrict the issuing of visas to people afflicted by HIV (a 
similarly arbitrary, misguided and archaic policy), but they do not prevent all risk-groups 
from entering the country. They deal with the issue on a case by case basis. I believe this 
approach needs to be adopted in our treatment of animals, too. If their papers are up to 
date (and consequently, by definition, are not a threat) then immediate entry ought to be 
permitted. If there are doubts about authenticity of papers or the papers are incomplete 
then perhaps a short quarantine ought to be considered, with careful inspection and 
monitoring by qualified veterinarians. There is no justification in subjecting all animals 
to a blanket, indiscriminate policy (especially given the consideration that some 
countries enjoy shorter periods of confinement, depending on the source country).  
 
Even from a purely anthropocentric perspective, according to which animals are not due 
any direct moral consideration, or are at least incapable of suffering relevantly like 
humans, most (if not all) people would agree that human proprietors of animals are able 
to feel and suffer loss. Humans who have their companion animals placed in quarantine 
are arguably suffering as a result of the separation from their loved ones. People often see 
companion animals as extended family. I know that if I decided to emigrate, I would go 
to a country where my dog does not need to spend any or much time in quarantine – I 
would be very upset if I had to be separated from her for months. Even if we have no 
direct duty to animals, we surely have indirect duties to their human companions. If this 
is correct, then there exists even a good anthropocentric reason for a thorough review of 
all quarantine processes – since animal quarantine can be seen as a human rights 
violation.  
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People who are prepared to take companion animals with them overseas are people who 
see their animals as individuals (and part of the family) rather than pieces of property; 
otherwise they would simply sell their animal and buy another one in the new country. 
This is because it is far cheaper to buy a dog than to travel with a dog. If your sofa was 
cheaper to buy than to transport, most financially-minded people would rather buy a 
new one. If someone has a sentimental attachment to a particular heirloom or piece of 
furniture - even if they could get a cheaper alternative at their destination - they would 
take the item. Likewise, you only take a pet with you if you are attached to the 
individual animal in question. If this is the case, one would naturally keep the pet in 
peak health. This means maintaining her diet and keeping up with her rabies shots. 
Putting an animal in good health in a kennel will more likely cause the pet to get sick 
rather than through the preferred alternative of keeping your pet with you. An animal 
that has had all their shots is not a threat to any local populations. 
 
Therefore, a more effective resolution needs to be sought. By taking the welfare of all the 
animals concerned into account (not simply the majority), we are able to determine a 
better solution. More modern and effective treatments and prevention of rabies and other 
diseases mean that by the time your pet arrives in the new country it poses no risk to the 
local populations. In fact, it would be irresponsible to allow a pet that is a potential 
threat into the target country – even via a period in quarantine. All the preventive 
measures should be undertaken before the pet leaves her source country. More common 
these days is to have the pet complete a process of inoculations in the year or six months 
leading up to departure. If her papers are all in order, the pet gets clearance to 
accompany her owners on the flight to the new country.  
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Animals’ interactions with humans often consist in the animals being used as a means to 
human ends. Sometimes the animal will be loved, as in the case of a companion animal 
– and one gets the impression that mostly this relationship is reciprocated or requited.  
Unfortunately, in the vast majority of instances the contra positioning of human and 
animal interests results in a disastrous experience for the animal. Here I would refer to 
animals being raised in factory farms, animals being used in experimentation, animals in 
zoos, animals being hunted, etc. Truly, there are many causes for an animal rights 
advocate to pursue. Why does animal quarantine deserve mention when there are so 
many more urgent issues regarding how animals are being used and abused? Animals are 
being killed by the billions each year to satisfy the human hunger for flesh – in terms of 
animal suffering this would surely be the number one issue.  
 
Not only do we sacrifice animals in order to eat them, we also ravage the planet in our 
cultivation of meat – because the production of meat is very resource intensive.74 So, why 
would the plight of a few (relatively speaking), somewhat pampered companion animals 
that happen to spend a few months in a kennel in quarantine be the appropriate topic to 
warrant an article of research? In relation, this would comprise low-level abuse. Many 
people would argue that it involves no abuse at all. If we look at the issue rationally, the 
animal in question most likely comes from a wealthy home (emigrants tend to have 
resources) and she is loved by humans - enough to be relocated at great cost. It costs 
thousands of ZAR to take a companion animal abroad and to have it go through the 
quarantine process. Arguably, only the most privileged pets would get to experience this 
situation.  
                                                          
74 Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, “Unintended Consequences of the Meat Industry”. 2004. 
http://woods.stanford.edu/evp.php?name=livestock  (accessed 29 June 2012). 
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My motivation to write this report is in part somewhat personal. I am South African / 
Australian and would ideally like to return to Australia to live. I would like to take my 
dog with me – yet, when I consider that she will have to spend so much time in 
quarantine, I baulk at the prospect. I cannot imagine she would make it through 
unscathed. She is a sensitive, rescue dog and every evening when I get home she is so 
excited and it is more than obvious that she, like many other dogs, suffers separation 
distress while I am away at work. My sister tells me she is quite different when I am 
away – she spends most of the day in her bed and is very subdued. So how could she 
cope with months of separation from me, her ‘owner’? I really do not think that it is a 
possibility – so now I am considering going to Canada instead – since there would be no 
quarantine. Sunny would accompany me on the flight and I would retrieve her on the 
other end. My second option is to first go to New Zealand, let Sunny spend ten days in 
quarantine and then live there for six months before relocating to Melbourne – sans 
quarantine.  
 
If animals suffer in quarantine, or their interests are infringed, we are obligated to 
reassess the situation. Naturally, it could be argued that animals do not suffer and that 
they do not have interests by philosophers like Michael Leahy75 and R. G. Frey.76 
However, I have argued that animals are able to suffer and they do so in quarantine and 
that they do have interests and that these are frustrated in quarantine. These conditions 
being satisfied imply that we owe it to animals to end the procedure.  
 
Additionally, by admission of the countries involved, quarantine is an onerous process 
for companion animals. Australia does not recommend subjecting older dogs to 
                                                          
75 Leahy, M.P.T. 1994, ch. 7. 
76 Frey, R.G. 1980, ch. 2. 
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quarantine – since they may not survive. This implies that it is an arduous endeavour. 
Both England and New Zealand concede, in the reasons for their change in quarantine 
procedures, that eliminating / reducing the quarantine period will save the pet a certain 
amount of distress and that it will make more sense economically. If only for the time 
period the animal is incarcerated, there is an argument that this amounts to suffering in 
terms of freedom lost.  
5.2 Why is the Issue Important? 
The issue of quarantine needs to be addressed because we are witnessing an on-going 
abuse of sentient beings – albeit in the guise of the provision of some necessary and 
valuable service. I believe that this is causing harm to animals. Just like we harm animals 
in vivisection or factory farming or hunting, we can be said to harm animals while they 
are isolated in quarantine. Since animals cannot object, those making policy and rules 
are not under a huge amount of pressure to justify the quarantine. Animals do not have a 
desire to spend months in a small cage – and normally try to escape. I think the 
quarantine situation is analogous to animals being kept in zoos. In his paper ‘Do 
Animals Have a Right to Liberty’, James Rachels writes of the zoo experience for 
animals: 
It is a familiar fact that many wild animals do not fare at all well in captivity: taken from 
their natural habitats and put in zoos, they are at first frantic and frustrated because they 
cannot carry on their normal activities; then they become listless and inactive, shadows 
of their former selves.77 
 
He also writes about increased rates of disease among zoo animals and a shorter life span 
than wild counterparts – although some evidence points to the contrary, i.e. that zoo 
animals have longer lives than those in the wild. Companion animals that are confined 
                                                          
77 Regan, T. and Singer, P. 1976, p. 210. 
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would have a similar experience. They may not be wild, but they would most times be 
used to space and more liberty than is available at kennels or quarantine 
accommodation. In effect, they are not able to move around freely or follow their wants. 
Companion dogs love the routine of  their daily walk – I know my Sunny gets extremely 
excited when we go for a walk and she knows as soon as I get her lead that she is about 
to go for her walk and she is extremely animated and ecstatic.  
  
Captive animals arguably experience a certain amount of psychological suffering. 
Another situation analogous to quarantine can be experienced when visiting the SPCA. 
The animals are similarly confined to cages – sometimes more than one animal to a 
cage. The dogs are very noisy and bark constantly. The experience is not pleasant for a 
human visitor – the cages are small and mainly concrete. I cannot imagine what it is like 
for a resident. When we chose our rescue dog Sunny, she was very timid and was being 
bullied by her cage mate. All in all there was little evidence that this was an environment 
conducive to animals’ surviving, let alone flourishing and being happy. The animals did 
not seem healthy, and to me they all seemed distressed. After we had our dog a few days 
she became extremely ill with kennel cough.  
 
This is not to say that animals in quarantine are always unhappy or always get sick – but 
living in close quarters with other dogs that may be sick will put healthy dogs at a greater 
chance of picking up a virus or disease. Indeed the concept of quarantine is a misnomer – 
since animals are not being individually isolated, as is the case for humans suspected of 
contagious disease. Actually, a lot of animals from all over the world are being kept 
together at close quarters away from the local population. This situation is in itself 
questionable in regard to effectiveness and safety for the residents. I would argue that the 
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situation is more prone to spreading disease than the alternative of allowing each pet to 
remain with her owners.  
 
One of the most generous of human qualities is that of compassion and consideration. 
What makes us human is in part an ability to try to put ourselves in another’s position – 
to empathise and sympathise with others. We should be able to consider non-human 
animals in our feelings too. They are more deserving of our consideration because they 
cannot argue for themselves and they rely on us to speak for them. It would be a serious 
lapse on our part to tolerate harm towards animals without voicing our concerns. Just 
like we disapprove of dog-fighting or donkeys forced to work long hours, we should 
voice concerns about any animal suffering. To ignore their plight makes us lesser 
humans and puts us below the animals. We often rely on our capacity for compassion or 
altruism to emphasise how we are better than other beings. The question arises whether 
this is only when it is convenient to us. Even if someone could argue that animals are not 
worthy of moral concern – at the very least we do owe their human owners moral 
consideration and would therefore need to give weight to their interests. Even if an 
animal cannot be said to ‘suffer’ in quarantine, the animal’s owner is clearly suffering.  
 
Some people may see freedom for animals as an instrumental good - or means to an end. 
But some philosophers (like Gruen) believe that it is of intrinsic worth – or good in its 
own right.78 This is because animals need (at least some) freedom to flourish, just as 
humans do. A trapped or caged animal will not be as happy as the same animal that has 
freedom to run and play. Horsthemke writes that ‘the practice of keeping individuals in 
                                                          
78 Gruen, L. 2011, pp. 141 - 144. 
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captivity is morally reprehensible in that it constitutes a bar to the natural unfolding of 
lives, whatever one’s potential or capacities’.79  
 
Politically sophisticated, democratic countries like Australia and New Zealand - would 
possibly like to be seen as world leaders in honouring the welfare of animals - evidenced 
by the countries’ generally enlightened stance on animal experimentation, whale hunting 
and factory farming etc. This is evidenced in the following in the Australian Department 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry website - ‘Australia is free from some of the 
world’s major agricultural and aquatic pests and diseases, and is a world leader in animal 
welfare’ (emphasis added).80 These countries would probably not even comprehend the 
charge of recalcitrance. The highlighting of the quarantine issue to authorities would 
alert someone in government to an ongoing inconsistency in public policy. This could 
lead to a more holistic, effective and ultimately even a more economically viable 
resolution of the matter.  
 
 Some people regard the keeping of companion animals as a form of animal harm – and 
advocate the cessation of even this practice. If this view is at all accepted, then clearly the 
quarantine of companion animals is even more of harm to those animals. Nonetheless, I 
do not see a philosophical contradiction in my position on the desirability of removing 
quarantine and of the permissibility of keeping pets. I do not regard the keeping of 
companion animals as harming them. I see it as a symbiotic relationship between human 
and non-human animals, especially when we are referring to commonly domesticated 
animals such as dogs and cats. It does not make sense to ‘free’ companion animals; 
                                                          
79 Horsthemke, K. 2010, p. 60. 
80 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Animal and Plant Health 
Home”. 7 August 2012. http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health  (accessed 22 September 2012). 
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although it may be argued that we should stop breeding them. If they were ‘freed’ and 
left to their own devices, they would likely not survive – and this is surely a fate worse 
than domestication. I believe that especially in the case of rescue dogs or cats, the 
keeping of them as pets is a beneficial service to them rather than a harm, provided they 
are treated with respect and provided all the nurture, nutrition, water, medicine and 
space to live full lives. I do, however, regard animal quarantine as an actual and real 
harm.  
 
People whose pets are forced to endure the hardship of quarantine must also pay for the 
displeasure. One fact that the figures of rabies incidence expected in the UK’s 
calculations above highlight is that for an infinitely small chance of rabies being 
introduced to animal or human, thousands of animals each year were going through the 
quarantine process. From a consequentialist standpoint, this would be hard to justify. 
This can surely not be just. Would the UK have changed their rules if Europe had not 
forced their hand? This is a not an easy question to answer – maybe an answer could lie 
in the decision behind New Zealand’s standardising of their rules. Most important is the 
point that things are changing – all for the animals’ welfare.  
 
Obviously, since rabies control has improved so much, any continuance of onerous 
quarantine rules constitutes unnecessary suffering for the animal. Countries with 
draconian quarantine periods cannot claim that the processes are in place in order to 
exclude disease – since it is proven that other countries are able to remain disease-free via 
more humane methods. A consequentialist argument of protecting the majority local 
population against introduced disease can no longer be made if there is no viable threat 
to the local humans and non-humans. I believe that this condition is met by improved 
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rabies and disease control. There is therefore no threat to animals or humans posed if the 
animal’s papers are in order. In fact, consequentialist claims can be made that one needs 
to include quarantine animals in the calculation of net overall utility. The situation for 
quarantine dogs and cats needs to be also taken into consideration and their unhappiness 
would count against the total happiness or utility of the local population. Ironically, 
since there is no real threat to local populations of animals to healthy dogs being 
introduced, the best consequences are arrived at by keeping the import dogs happy. 
 
There are some concerns about a virus related to rabies - Australian bat lyssavirus – that 
is present in Australia. ‘Lyssaviruses are a group of viruses that includes rabies and 
Australian bat lyssavirus’.81 Lyssavirus is not normally transmitted to humans, and only 
two people have become infected and died. As is the case for rabies, once symptoms 
appear, there is no cure. The incidence of lyssavirus raises the possibility of rabies 
running through wild populations too – and not necessarily being spread by domestic 
animals. It is possible for rabies to be carried by all warm-blooded animals (although 
birds are not affected). If animals in quarantine are a threat, then under the current 
regime, it would be presumably possible for a rat or bat to become infected with rabies 
through contact with an infected dog in quarantine and then pass the condition on to a 
local uninfected animal.  
 
In addition, grouping companion animals from every corner of the globe together in 
quarantine is not the most effective way to combat rabies. One needs to look to a more 
holistic and viable way to handle the situation – rather than to try and isolate imported 
                                                          
81 New South Wales State Government: Australia – Health, “Rabies and Australian Bat Lyssavirus 
Infection”. 11 October 2011. 
http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/factsheets/infectious/rabiesbatinfection.html  (accessed 29 June 2012). 
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animals. According to the Australian Quarantine website, rabies can take up to a year or 
longer to manifest82 – so even with their strict policy, there is a chance that some animals 
could carry rabies undetected through the quarantine period – however minute the 
chance may be. This implies that the existing quarantine regime could fail. It would 
make more sense to make sure that the pet’s papers are in order rather than putting the 
emphasis on a period of quarantine. Additionally, inoculating local domesticated 
animals would be a more prudent method and even more failsafe. It would at least add 
an extra degree of protection. We are living in an increasingly globalised world and 
people are travelling inter-continentally overnight. Surely we need more modern ways to 
handle all aspects of migration rather than methods having their origins in the 1800s. 
Australia has an additional problem with illegal migrants arriving by boats along the 
long porous northern sea border - via countries like Indonesia. Surely it is possible that 
infected animals could arrive this way (possibly an infected rat aboard a ship) and 
present a more viable rabies threat than domestic animals that go through a formal 
importation procedure. So, if the rabies risk is great, it would make sense for local dogs 
and cats to be inoculated. 
 
I will now discuss selected moral theories in defence of my position. I will elaborate on 
Deontology, Virtue Theory, the Capabilities Approach and Theriophilia. The moral 
theory I feel most complements my viewpoint and supports my argument is Deontology 
– because it supports direct human obligations towards non-humans – if not the 
correlative rights of the latter. It does not rely on charity or kindness towards, or love of 
                                                          
82 Australian Government: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, “Rabies”. 21 June 2011. 
http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health/pests-diseases-weeds/animal/rabies  (accessed 29 June 
2012). 
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animals, calls to animal dignity or inherent value, or considerations of consequences of 
action – it concentrates on what is the right thing to do on the basis of direct duty. 
5.3 Deontology83 
Deontology is the moral theory of direct duty – in other words, of the morality or 
goodness of acts themselves. Its name derives from the Greek words for duty and science 
and it is closely associated with Kant. Kant emphasised the importance of making 
choices out of a sense of good will. The theory is most concerned with treating moral 
subjects as autonomous entities. These subjects are to be treated respectfully and also as 
ends in themselves rather than as a means to an end. This means that we do not use 
people (merely) for our own purposes – we always treat people the way we want to be 
treated. The theory also emphasises a moral agent performing a right action in any given 
circumstance requiring a moral decision. It is important to note that Kant did not regard 
animals as being moral subjects. He felt that we are under no direct obligation to treat 
them well, as he did not consider them as rational beings. He saw humans in a 
completely different league entirely and ‘special’ among other animals. Kant did feel 
however, that we may have indirect duties towards animals, in that treating them badly 
could make human interactions more abrasive. Modern deontological thought and more 
recent philosophers do regard animals deserving of consideration however – as animals 
are seen to have some desires and goals for the future. Kant would possibly support 
respectful treatment of pets if we consider obligations toward their human owners. 
 
According to deontology, the consequences of the act are not as important as performing 
the correct action. Rights-based theories can tend to favour the individual rather than a 
majority. Especially from an absolutist position, these theories would consider that 
                                                          
83 Rachels, J. and S. 2010, chs. 9 & 10. 
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sacrificing one baby to save a nation an incorrect action – even if people think this is 
ludicrous and impractical. This theory often tends to work in opposition to a 
consequentialist theory, since consequentialism does not primarily concern itself with the 
action itself, but rather the consequences of that action. The aggregated happiness or 
good of all the morally considerable entities impacted by a decision is the important 
consideration when evaluating a moral choice. Thus, if a consequentialist theory 
supports quarantine in order to safeguard local populations of animals and humans, the 
deontological position would arguably tend to emphasise the harm suffered by the 
quarantined animal (and her owner), since putting the individual animal through an 
experience that violates its interests could not be justified by pointing to any greater good 
obtained by the larger population. Thus, ‘for deontologists, the Right has priority over 
the Good’.84 In other words, allowing an animal to suffer unnecessarily could not be seen 
as the right choice by the deontologist.  
 
One could also argue along Kantian lines that even if animals enjoy no moral standing, 
we may still owe it to one another as sensitive humans to treat animals respectfully and 
kindly.85 That is, we should not subject them to lengthy periods of quarantine – seven 
months in quarantine for a dog could be considered analogous to four years for a human 
if we believe the popular adage that each human year is like seven years for a dog. In 
support of this, dogs do tend to have very short lives, comparatively speaking.  
                                                          
84 Alexander, Larry and Moore, Michael, "Deontological Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-
deontological/ , p. 4. (accessed 14 July 2012). 
85 Rachels, J. and S. 2010, p. 136. 
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5.4 Virtue Theory86 
Virtue Ethics can be attributed to both Aristotle and Plato.87 It is one of the three major 
applied ethics normative theories along with consequentialism and deontology. 
Although the ‘virtues’ have changed over time from ones like courage, honour and 
generosity in Plato’s time through to faith, hope and charity according to Christian 
moral tradition, the currently accepted virtues are more secular but include qualities like 
compassion, honesty, justice, benevolence and tolerance. So with Virtue Theory, 
generous human qualities are esteemed in one’s treatment of other moral subjects. The 
virtues are seen to be the kind of qualities that make a ‘good’ or just person. These 
qualities are generally the type that would be found in almost all cultures and are not 
limited to a Christian culture. ‘Aristotle said that a virtue is a trait of character 
manifested in habitual action’.88 Thus, they would be considered good in most cultures 
and would transcend cultural boundaries. Therefore, virtuous actions would not be 
subject to criticisms of cultural relativism (which attempts to explain differing moral 
views according to culture). In other words, a virtue in one culture would not be 
considered a vice when ‘enacted’ in another culture. 
 
Extending this idea of virtue theory to human interactions with animals could likewise 
be seen as apposite and definitely virtuous. If the theory can hold across cultures, it can 
likewise hold across species. Therefore, showing qualities like compassion and kindness 
to animals is as appropriate as exhibiting these qualities in our human interactions.89 
This means that, other things being equal, we should not tolerate anything causing 
                                                          
86 Rachels, J. and S. 2010, ch.12. 
87 Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/ethics-virtue/ (accessed 14 
July 2012). 
88 Rachels, J. and S. 2010, p. 160. 
89 Rachels, J. and S. 2010, ch.12. 
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suffering to our pets. Central to virtue theory a concept called eudaimonia – which 
encompasses the rights of a being to flourish. For animals to flourish they would need to 
be content and free to follow their interests – and unnecessary suffering could not be 
consistent with eudaimonia. Contentment could not be possible living at close quarters 
with hundreds of other dogs and cats in small cages.  
 
Eudaimonia has traditionally been viewed in terms of human flourishing and has not 
been extended to non-human animals – for the reason that they are not (considered) 
rational. But if an animal is able to flourish, then there is no reason why a theory of 
virtue should not support this goal in terms of animals too. Animals are clearly able to 
flourish – they evidently benefit from being kept in good condition and being well 
exercised (healthy coats and bright eyes are testimony to this). It doesn’t seem fair not to 
recognise such a goal if there is any debate over their rationality. If a being can flourish, 
we owe it to them to aim for this, and to call for an end to quarantine.  
5.5 Capabilities Approach90 
The capabilities approach, which has been proposed by Martha Nussbaum (following 
Amartya Sen), would aid my argument through an emphasis on animals’ claim to 
dignity. Nussbaum has developed a capabilities list for human empowerment and 
freedom – which includes the kind of factors or qualities that allow a person to live a life 
worthy of human dignity. The kind of capabilities Nussbaum lists for human potential 
include the following amongst others: life – the ability to live a full-term life; bodily health 
– to live in good health and be well nourished; bodily integrity – to be free from assault 
and affiliation – to be able to live with others of one’s choice. She believes that having 
                                                          
90 Sunstein, C.R. and Nussbaum, M. eds. 2004, “Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions”, 
ch.14. 
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access to these kinds of capabilities is the basis for a life of human dignity. She has also 
adapted this list to accommodate animals with factors more applicable to reaching 
dignity in their lives.  
The kind of factors or qualities included on Nussbaum’s capabilities list for animals are: 
affiliation - including being granted the legal status of dignified beings; practical reason – 
including plenty of room to move around; play – adequate space and an environment 
conducive to a pleasurable existence and control over one’s environment which includes 
territorial integrity of their environment. Animals in quarantine would not be ‘capable’ 
of achieving any of the above qualities. In terms of affiliation, they could not be enjoying 
the legal status of a dignified being while languishing in a cage. In regard to practical 
reason and play, there would be very little space to move around or an environment 
conducive to a pleasurable existence. The creature in quarantine is not conceded much 
‘dignity’ at all – and her capabilities or choices are very limited. In short, the capabilities 
approach supports an animal’s desire for a state of existence in which they can be as free 
as possible and reach their own kind of potential for a dignified and full animal life. This 
would be analogous to a human’s desire to lead a dignified human life. A fully 
developed human would have advanced capabilities – e.g. a woman should believe that 
any career or life expectation is within her grasp or that she can aspire to human dignity 
via the capabilities list. Likewise, for an animal for which freedom is an intrinsic good, 
the quarantine situation would be abhorrent – and contra-indicated for a dignified life.  
5.6 Theriophilia91 
Theriophilia means ‘love of animals’, or to literally be fond of animals. While Stephen 
Clark termed this orientation ‘zoophilia’, Horsthemke has suggested the term ‘theriophilia’ ‘for 
                                                          
91 Horsthemke, K. 2010, pp. 172 - 174.  
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reasons of etymological consistency’.92 Yet, as Horsthemke writes, ‘to be fond of something 
or someone does not provide a basis for consistent moral concern, let alone establish that 
someone or something has moral standing’.93 Conversely, believing animals are 
deserving of moral concern does not make one an animal lover – one may support the 
cause more out of a sense of justice. So it is not completely clear that theriophiles would 
consistently object to quarantine – but they may be more predisposed to arguments in 
favour of moral consideration for animals rather than people who are animal haters or 
people convinced that animals are not due any consideration. This would be particularly 
true if theriophiles believed that animals suffer in quarantine – since an animal lover 
would find animal abuse or suffering abhorrent. If there is any doubt about how an 
animal would cope in quarantine, we should not subject them to the experience. As I 
have argued, it is most likely that animals do suffer in quarantine, so theriophiles would 
likely support an end to the practice. I cannot believe a pet owner would consider 
quarantine for their pet if it was not mandatory – even if they believed the animal would 
not suffer at all. Therefore, in light of evidence that animals do indeed suffer, we should 
eliminate quarantine where possible. 
 
Even though the deontological approach may seem in a way to contradict itself (with 
Kant not respecting animals and deontology seemingly emphasising the supreme moral 
significance of the individual animal), I consider this the theory that most closely aligns 
with my view of quarantine. This is because I do not feel that putting an individual 
animal through a time of unnecessary suffering is justified by pointing to gains of the 
local animal population. Doing the right thing means we have a duty to end quarantine. 
Virtue theory is also strong in terms of support for quarantine animals, but its motivation 
                                                          
92 Ibid, p. 173.  
93 Ibid. 
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could be seen to be out of a sense of human charity to the animals rather than doing the 
correct thing for animals. The capabilities approach is good in theory, but one may find 
it more difficult to argue against quarantine on the basis of extending the capabilities list 
to animals, compared to the safety of the local animal population. I believe that we need 
to see their suffering as something that requires direct attention, rather than mediate 
concern based on somewhat less urgent and more esoteric capabilities. I think that 
theriophilia does not really provide a strong enough argument in favour of eliminating 
animal quarantine – since theriophiles could possibly consider arguments in favour of 
the local populations of animals above quarantine animals. 
 
6 Risks and Recommendations 
 
Obviously, a major concern would be that the current quarantine regime in a particular 
country could allow problems or diseases to enter a country. By placing the emphasis on 
detection in quarantine rather than prevention prior to entry, this remains a valid issue. It 
makes more sense to adopt a preventative strategy rather than a cure or remedy 
approach. Since it is possible for rabies to take more than a year to manifest, it would 
make most sense to insist on a reliable history of at least one year of rabies vaccinations – 
before the animal can be considered for import. The rules applied would need to take 
younger animals into consideration – as is the case for Canada. Clearly, if there are any 
doubts about the authenticity of the animal’s credentials, then the animal should not be 
allowed to travel. Just as a human’s passport or visa is checked before she can board a 
flight, so should the animal’s papers be verified prior to departure. If checks and balances 
are in place to ensure sufficient measures exist, then onerous quarantine periods are not 
warranted. Obviously, the target country should insist on reputable and approved 
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certificates – and in the absence of these there could be a fallback position to ensure 
protection of local populations. This could include disallowing importation to prevent 
any threat. This kind of approach would be more robust than trying to control the risk 
from within the target country.  
 
I also recommend that all companion animals are inoculated against rabies – even in 
rabies ‘free’ countries like Australia and England. Animals do not respect borders and 
even islands are able to be breached by migratory animals like bats (or sea mammals) 
that are able to carry the rabies virus – possibly infecting local animals. This approach 
would be far more holistic and effective in protecting local animals and humans. There 
may not be enough of a threat to humans, but if rabies really is a concern, humans too 
could be inoculated.  
 
I recommend that the quarantine process be changed in all countries with long detention 
periods – to bring them into line with global trends. The process is not as effective as it 
could be and it would make more sense to replace it with a new process – one that is 
kinder to pets and owners alike. The upside is that making positive changes to this 
process will not involve any loss of confidence in countries maintaining their disease-free 
status.  
 
7 Conclusion and Implications 
 
We owe it to our animal brethren to reject any unnecessary suffering they endure due to 
time spent in quarantine. Cats and dogs are sophisticated, sentient beings, capable of 
suffering through the deprivation of freedom. They have interests in maintaining their 
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(relative) freedom and this is compromised through time they spend in quarantine. 
Luckily, quarantine is not a necessary evil. Fortunately, adequate examples (that could be 
seen as control experiments) exist for countries where quarantine is not practised. None 
of these countries is witnessing a rabies epidemic. Their animal import rules are based on 
modern, scientific research and experience – no country will take a risk on such an 
important issue. Advances in disease control have lead to a much needed rationalisation 
of rules. This pragmatic approach should be introduced in all countries where strict, 
outdated rules are still practised. We are not dealing with harmless regulations and 
bureaucracy - we are talking about real and unnecessary suffering for our best friends 
during this costly process. There should be pressure brought to bear on those who 
maintain these procedures – the onus is on them to justify their treatment of our 
companion animals. This tardiness in reassessing their procedures would not be tolerated 
if we were dealing with humans. Those countries that are reluctant to change with the 
times need to be lobbied to make those changes. There is a need to introduce more 
effective, more humane regulations. This change would lead to a more sober, effective 
treatment to the issue – we are able to achieve the same aim of disease control - without 
dropping standards or effectiveness of treatment. Simultaneously, animals would reap 
the benefits of far more humane, modern and economical rules.  
 
Where there is any doubt on exactly how animals experience this kind of loss of liberty, 
we should be giving them the benefit of the doubt. A review of current practices in those 
countries where quarantine is still a reality should be conducted. This should lead to a 
much safer, happier solution for all those people and animals that need to go through the 
stressful process of migration. Quarantine should be assigned to the history books in the 
same way slavery has been. 
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